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MO~HAGUE GRAMMAR AND ISSUES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY 
Barbara H. Partee 
Prepared for the Conference on Language and Psychotherapy 
of the Institute for Philosophy of Science, Psychotherapy, 
and Ethnics, April 1977 
l. Introduction 
Philosophers, linguists, and psychologists all share an interest in 
the semantics of ordinary language, but the same facts which account for 
the relevance of natural language semantics to such a wide range of fields 
also lead to frequent disagreement as to what the central questions of 
semantics are and as to the criteria by which semantic descriptions and 
semantic theories shou1 d be judged. Without trying to be prescriptive, I 
will begin by indicating three kinds of central problems which I believe are 
potentially of common concern in all of these approaches to semantics; then 
I will suggest some ways in which reasonable differences as to goals and 
criteria of adequacy may be reflected in different idealizations that are 
invoked by investigators in different fields. 
The first problem can be put as follows; each natural language has 
infinitely many sentences, and native speakers can produce and understand 
indefinitely many sentences they have never heard or uttered before. The 
semantic side of this ability is the abi1ity to associate meanings, whatever 
meanings may be, with each of the infinite set of sentences of the language. 
The task for a semantic theory then is to specify how this can be done in 
a finite way, presumably via a system involving a direct specification of 
the meanings of some finite set of primitive elements and a finite set of 
rules capable of associating meanings with all of the remaining, non-primitive 
expressions. The second and third questions relate to narrowing down 
somewhat the vague concept of meaning. The second is how to appropriately 
capture entailment relations between sentences within a semantic description; 
1
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tt1is assumes that part of what is to be understood by the meaning of a sentence 
is that by virtue of whicn certain sentences can be said to follow from other 
sentences. Tne psycnologist may be interested primarily in the inferences 
people actually draw. and the philosopher primarily in characterizing 
inferences whicn are logically valid, but I believe such differences can be 
expressed mainly as differences in criteria for the correctness of competing 
answers to tile same question, namely how to characterize entailment relations 
between sentences. The third question, which is the least universally 
accepted of the three, is how to characterize the truth-conditions for 
sentences of a natural language. The importance of this question rests on 
the idea that a fundamental part of knowing the meaning of a sentence is 
knowing something like under what conditions it would be true, coupled with 
the ooservation tilat even ttie most complete specification of entailment 
relations among sentences will not tie the meanings of any of the sentences 
down to anything outside of language but only to other sentences of the same 
language. I will return below to some of the difficulties invo~ved in 
taking the search for truth-conditions as one of the central problems of 
semantics, but at tne outset I will simply accept it. since it has been taken 
as fundamental in the kind of semantic theory I want to discuss. 
Now let us ela~orate briefly on the suggestion above that the different 
interests in such questions from the perspectives of different fields may 
lead to different criteria of adequacy and in turn to different idealizations. 
~icnard Montague, who should be regarded as relatively extreme in tl1is respect 
even for a philosopher, was interested in a very general conception of 
possib1e languages, one at least broad enough to cover both natural languages 
and the artificial languages constructed by logicians; he had no interest 
in delimiting the class of possible human languages, which is the central 
concern of linguists. Hence where the linguist idealizes to an ideally 
competent speaker-hearer in a iiomogeneous speech community, and asks about 
the internalized systems of rules and representations that such a language 
user must have "in his head'\ so to speak, Montague idealized still farther, 
and did not talk of speaker-hearers at all. Much as a mathematician 'can 
study alternative systems of geometry without being concerned either 
about which geometry fits physical space or about how people form conceptions 
or intuitions about geometrical objects, Montague studied languages as 
formal objects, consisting of pairings between forms and meanings, where 
the meaning of a sentence is taken to be a structural specification of 
the conditions under which it would be true in any possible state of affairs, 
~"-~~=~:~~~human t~9nitio-~ ~nd language· mf~~~i~tr~t~ifff"lO ,~~m;i __ _ ~ 
idealizations as a starting point, but a psychologist interested in 
individual differences among peop1e might not want to accept the assumption 
of the homogeneous speech community, particularly if he wanted to explore 
the extent to ,..,nicn individual differences in knowledge, beliefs, and 
attitudes may be reflected in individual differences in language use 
witnin what may otherwise be reasonably regarded as a homogeneous speech 
community. · 
If we try to impose the talk of speaker-hearers on Montague, we have 
to assume a speaker who knows his language perfectly, is ideally rational, 
and is furthermore capable of conceptualizing a complete description of 
every possible world, e.g.; God; the linguist is inclined to assume 
something like com~lete knowledge of the language and idea11zed if not . 
2
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perfect rationality but not complete knowledge of what a11 the possible 
worlds are like {but rather some internalized model corresponding to 
conceptual possibility, or what Chomskyl has called 1 common-sense under-
standing'); and the psychologist interested in individual differences 
proiJal.Jly wants to weaken the idealizations still further in various 
directions. The question of whether an approach to semantics developed 
with one set of idealizations can be relevant to an inquiry with a different 
set is a serious one, and of course one which cannot be answered!_ priori 
in a general way. My goal in ttlis paper is to suggest that Montague's 
framework can be of relevance to linguistic and psychological concerns 
as well as philosophical ones, and that one can profitably attempt to 
develop linguistic and psycholcgical theories of semantics by a combination 
of extensions and restrictions on various components of a Montague-like 
genera 1 tbeory. 
In section 2 below I will describe Montague's framework briefly, 
and sketch some of the kinds of restrictions that a linguist might 
incorporate to try to characterize a theory of possible human languages 
as a subtheory of Montague's general theory. In section 3 I will suggest 
that the underlying models of Montague's model-theoretic semantics might 
be interpreted in various ways that could be relevant to a consideration 
of individual differences in beliefs and cenceptions of reality, although 
I believe this will require extensions as well as restrictions on the 
class of models allowed by the theory. The pur.pose of the discussion is 
not to argue that linguists, philosophers, -and psychologists should all 
tackle semantic issues by 11doing 11 Montague grarrmar, but rather to suggest 
that if this way of looking at things is coherent and fruitful, it 
could heJp to facilitate discussion of theoretical issues involving 
quite different-looking theories. 
2. Montague grammar and transformational madificatio~ 
2.1 Syntax and semantics 
The version of Montague's framework that I will outline here, 
which comes from Montague (1973), gives a description of a natural 
language in three parts; a set of syntactic formation rules for the set 
of well-formed expressions of the language; a corresponding set of 
translation rules translating the set of natural language expressions 
into a langua-ge of intensional logic; and a model-theoretic semantics 
for the intensional logic, which gives for each sentence of the 
intensional logic a specification of the conditions under which _it 
would be true with respect to any given possible world. Truth conditions 
for English sentences are obtained via the truth conditions for their 
translations, and entailment relations are definable in terms of the 
truth conditions. I will say more about the intensional models in 
section 2.3 below; here I will concentrate an the basic form of the 
syntactic rules and their relation to the translation rules. 
The syntactic rules in a Montague grammar specify how to build 
up complex expressions of all of the categories of a given language, 
starting from a specification of the lexical items and their assignment 
to syntactic categories. Each rule specifies a way in which expressions 
of some given categories can be combined, and specifies the category 
3
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of the resulting combination. The form of a syntactic rule can be 
represented as in (l) below:2 
( 1) If a is of category c1 and a is of category c2, then y is of 
category c3, where Y = Fi ( a , a ) . 
The syntactic details of how n and a are combined to give a new phrase-v 
are all. contained in the function f.; the syntactic operations may be 
as simpJe as concatenation or as co~plex as a transformational operation. 
To a li:nguist familiar with transformational gr-a1T111ar, Montague's syntax 
gives the -appeara nee of a bottom;.up derivation, with phrase-structure-1 i ke 
rules and transformation-like rules freely interspersed in ' building up 
complex expressions from their constituents. 
,,, 
A main source of interest in Montague's system is the basic constraint 
he impcises on the relation betwe~n syntax and semantics. for each 
syntactic rule which combines expressions a and a to form a new expression 
y, there must be a corresponding semantic rule3 which giv:es the interpretation 
of the wcomplex expression Y as a function of the interpretations of the 
constituent express i ans a and a . We can represent the fa.rm of a 
semantic rule as in (2) below: 
{2) If a translates into a• and a translates into~', then F1( ~,a 
translates into Gk{u 1 ,a 1). 
Here a1 and B' are expressions in the intensional logic, and the function 
Gk will yield a new expression of the log;c having u' and ·a1 as subparts. 
One could think of the granmar then as a set of ordered pairs ( syntactic 
rulep i' semantic rulek) i the syntactic rule will given the syntax-specific 
details of how the component phrases are to be combined, and the semantic 
rule will given the semantics-specific details of how the ,meaning of 
the whole is determined from the meanings of the parts. 
Let me illustrate both the rules and the constraint with a pair 
of exa~ples. The first concerns noun phrases containing restrictive 
relative clauses, as in example (3). 
Syntactically, linguists have debated about the following two possible 
structures for the noun phrase (i.gnoring for the moment the question 
of the underlying source of tne relative pronoun which): 
(3a) ~ 
~ s 
Det N ~ I I -~~. ~~~.......,.. 
the dress wh1ch Mary bought 
4
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(3b) 
-----NP~ 
Det Norn 
the 
Norn 
I 
'.~ 
'1 dress 
I have argued elsewhere4 that Montague's constraint forces the 
choice of the second structure, with the relative clause modifying the 
common noun, if we wish to be able to give a uniform account of the 
semantics of the and other determiner and quantifier words. A first 
approximation to the semantics of the in singular noun phrases involves 
the condition that there is one anclonly one something-or-other 1n 
the given universe of discourse; (3) does not imply that there is only 
one dress, but that there is only one thing which both is a dress and 
is something Mary bought. Thus the relative clause should be part of 
the structure to which the determiner applies as it is in (3b) but 
isnot in {3a). The structure diagra1'111led in (3b) can be represented 
97 
in terms of Montague grammar by a pair of rules: one rule which combines 
a common noun phrase (NOM) with an open sentence to make a new conman 
noun phrase, and another which combines a determiner with a corrmon 
noun phrase (NOM) to make a term phrase (NP). Omitting details, the 
first of these can be written as follows: 
(4) If a is of category NOM and~ is of category S, then y is of 
category NOM, where y=F3(a,~), and F3(a,y} is ••• 
The specification of F~ spells out the operations 
clause formation, by wnich an input sentence~ of 
is converted into the relative clause "which Mary 
is concatenated with the head NOM. 
involved in relative 
the form "Mary bought x 11 
bought", and the result 1 
The corresponding semantic interpretation rule is basically just 
a conjunction of predicates, the two relevant predicates in this case 
amounting to (i} being a dress and (ii) being an x. such that Mary -bought 
x1 . ·rhe rule can be stated f orma 11 y5 as fo 11 ows: 
1 
(5) If a translates into a' ~nd ~ translates into e', then 
F3( e1, e) translates into xx1 (a 1 (x1)&~ 1 ) 
For thi? example, the interpretation of 1 dress which Mary bought 1 would 
come out essentially as follows: 
(6) xx1 (dress 1 (x1) & Past (buy'(Mary', x1))) 
The lambda operator turns a sentence into a predicate; the resulting 
predicate in (6) can be thought of as expressing 1the property of being 
an x1 such that x1 is a dress and Mary bought x1
1
• 
5
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The: details of the example are not of great interest per se to 
the issues at hand; I have included some of the details here in"""'order 
to illustrate the force of the requirement that each syntactic formation 
rule be given a uniform semantic interpretation, and also to illustrate 
how having an explicit fonnalism for the semantic interpretation rules 
makes it quite explicit whether a proposed grammar meets that requirement; 
In my opinion, one of the big methodological advances made possible by 
Montague'!> work is to put semantics on as rigorous and explicit a 
footi11g ~s was done for syntax by Chomsky. 
•,· 
The; second example concerns the distinction between predicative 
and attri .butive adjectives,6 which can be illustrated by the difference 
in validity of the inferences in (7) and (8) • 
. , 
~ 
(7} J (a~ 
_, ~~) 
(8}." ~~~ 
(c) 
,:· 
,. 
Susan is a red-haired doctor. 
Susan is a violinist. 
Therefore Susan is · a red-haired violinist. [VALID] 
Susan is a skillful doctor. 
Susan is a violinist. 
Therefore Susan is a skillful violinist. [INVALID] 
11Red-haired 11 1 a predicative adjective, simply picks out a set of individuals; 
the infer.ence in {7} is valid, since (7a) involves simply the conjunction 
of the properties of being red-haired. and being a doctor. "Skillful", 
an attributive adjective, does not simply express a property of individuals, 
however, as the invalidity of the inference in {8) shows. Parsons (1970) 
and others have proposed an elegant treatment of the semantics of 
.attributive adjectives that represents them as functions which aµply 
to the meanings or intensions of the coJIITIOn nouns with which. they are 
in construction; informally, wha~ it means to be a skillful doctor 
depends on what it means to be a doctor, and similarly for other nouns. 
(One corollary observation with potential practical utility for therapy 
is that any sentence which uses an attributive adjective alone in 
predicate position is semantically incomplete. a sentence like 'Susan 
is skillful I or 1 l 1m not successful I must be interpreted with respect 
to a furt,her predicate to which 'skillful I or I successful' can apply, 
~ 5·--g~~ - ~~~~~~~~~;~~ 
- •••••,.•-·---- cont ev.4-.-.::.,_,.::::....._  .,_._ .. ,..,_. . ._'" .,_. , .,._..,.., = ••-•••-•••-•••• •- - . ---- · •• • •••w - · - •- •• ,- ••' "'"- • • •_,N _,,,_ ·,•••- •-·••""""''""'. ''"''' ••· .~.• - •• ·- ,·,··-fr•• ••• ·,·••" 
A 1.. 
This distinction between predicative and attributive adjectives 
can be captured in a Montague framework by providing two distinct 
syntactic· derivations, each with its own semantic interpretation. Predicative 
adjectives start out in predicate positions, as in (9), and get into 
prenominal position by way of relative clauses, as in (1~}. 
(9} This block 1s cylindrical. 
(10) (a) Every block which is cylindrical is yellow. (b) Every cylindrical block is yellow. 
Such a derivation corresponds to the standard transformational treatment 
of all adjectives. For attributive adjectives, however, their semantic 
6
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properties together with Montague's constraint rule out such a derivation. 
Those adjectives are best treated as combining directly with a coll'UTlon 
noun to form a new co1TW11on noun phrase, semantically interpreted as a 
function applied to its argument. Many adjectives are ambiguous as 
between a predicative and attributive use, as is illustrated by sentence (11)7, 
for which both derivations are possible. 
(11} Marya is a beautiful dancer. 
Siegel (1976b) shows that there is a great deal of syntactic 
evidence in both Russian and English to support the double derivation 
of adjective-noun constructions and hence indirectly to support the 
requirement that each syntactic rule have a uniform semantic interpretation. 
It is this requirement, which is by no means uncontroversial, that accounts 
for a great deal of the current interest in Montague grammar; if it is 
borne out, it implies a strong connection between form and meaning 
in natural language; if it fails, it will be interesting to examine 
why and where syntax and semantics must diverge. 
2.2 Adding further constraints for natural languages. 
So far I have emphasized the constraint Montague 1s fra,nework 
imposes on the relation between syntax and semantics. Now I must turn 
to some of the ways in which Montague's theory is much too unconstrained 
with respect to the interests of linguists. The syntactic and ~emantic 
rule forms given in (1} and (2) 'above involve syntactic operations F1 and semantic operations G, and Montague put essentially no constraints 
whatever on the form &f these operations. If one is interested in charac-
terizing the class of all and only possible human languages, it is . 
imperative to look for constraints on the form of the operations allowed, 
and some of the recent linguistic work in the Montague framework is 
aimed at just that goal.8 I will not go into specifics here, but mention 
only that in this respect it seems reasonably natural to try to formulate 
a theory of possible gra!1111ars of natural languages as a restricted 
subtheory of Montague's more general theory, making use of the kinds 
of constraints on rules that have been formulated for transformational 
grammars. 
A quite different sort of constraint which is to some extent implicit 
in Montague's own work is what I call the 11well-formedness constraint. 11 9 
Since a Montague grammar works 11 bottom-up11 , constructing complex 
expressions from simpler ones, it is quite natural to impose the constraint 
that each expression built up in the course of a derivation be itself 
a well-formed expression of its respective syntactic category. This 
contrasts with the practice colTITIOn in transformational grammar of positing 
underlying or intermediate stages in derivations which are not themselves 
well-formed expressions, but which are transformed into well-formed 
expressions by obligatory rules. To give just one illustration of the 
effect of this constr.aint, let us consider attributive adjectives again. 
If all prenominal adjectives are derived from relative clauses, 
the postulated underlying sources are sometimes ungrammatical, as in 
7
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.,' "•l,----·~., -.. ;, 
a transformation derivation of (12b) from (12a}. 
(1;) (a) *the owner l:~~ch\ is rightful (b) the rightful owner 
Since ali' of the cases in which the relative clause source is ungrammatical 
are also ,cases where the adjective is semantically attributive, the 
analysis ;which generates attributive adjectives directly in :Prenominal 
pos1tion.:ra voids positing ill-formed underlying forms. Thus ;the well-
formednes:s constraint in this case provides independent syntactic 
motivatiori for choosing the same analysis that is required by the 
constrain,t on the relation between syntactic and semantic rules. 
' . 
The well-formedness constraint does not eliminate abstractness 
in syntai. but it essentially limits it to the operation of the rules 
which combine expressions to form new ones. By limiting the class of 
syntactic derivations, it limits the class of gratm1ars compatible with 
the surface data of a given language, and thereby provides a potentially . 
important restriction on the range of hypotheses a child might have 
to (unco~sciously) consider in the process of mastering the adult language. 
There are other kinds of constraints that could be sotight within 
a Montague framework; for example, one might try to find correlations 
between the form of a given syntactic rule and the form of the corresponding 
semantic t;nterpretation rule so as to strengthen still further the 
constraint on the relation between syntax and semantics. A great deal 
more descriptive analysis of particular constructions is req'uired, · 
however,
?since -
arguments about the correctness of various proposed 
constraints are invariably intertwined with arguments about :the best 
analysis iof particular constructions. But from the fragmentary 
evidence1available so far, one can at least say that there appears to 
be no obstacle to pursuing the goal of characterizing the syntax and 
semantics of possible human language as a subtheory of Monta.gue's 
theory by adding certain constraints motivated by empirical criteria 
of adequacy, criteria which may be of little interest to a philosopher 
or logician but of central concern to the linguist . F:~:~:-~~===.:=tc~= :~~=~~~-= --==~ 
of Montague (1973) proceeds in two stages : the first stage, illustrated 
aoove, is a rule-by-rule translation of expressions of the natural 
1anguage :into expressions in a language of.intensional 1ogic; the second 
stage involves a model-theoretic interpretation of the intensional logic. 
It .is at "the second stage that the notion of possible worlds plays 
I · 
I 
a critical role, and I want to try to sketch, non-technically, enough 
of what is involved in this second stage to raise certain issues about 
psychological reality. 
The intensional logic has primitive constants of various types, 
such as names of individuals, one-place predicates, operators on predicates, 
etc.t as ,well as variables of all these same types; the logic also 
contains various recursive means for forming complex express'ions 
8
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of a 11 the different types. An intensional model provides a domain of 
things outside of language for the expressions of the logic to refer 
to or be true of and a means of associating the expressions of the iogic 
with particular entities or states-or-affairs in the model, so as to 
tie down the truth-conditions of the sentences of the logic and the 
references of the terms to appropriate non-linguistic anchors. The 
aspect of the models that I want to focus on is their inclusion of 
a set of non-actua1 possible worlds, treated as ,primitive (i.e., not 
defined or derived) within the theory. The motivation for the possible 
worlds part of possible worlds semantics has been its fruitfulness in 
providing an adequate account of the truth conditions in the actual 
101 
world for sentences involving such "intensional" notions as logical 
possibility and necessity, contrary-to-fact conditionals, and psychological 
attitudes such as beliefs. hopes, and wishes, just to mention a small 
sample. · · 
Let me illustrate the key notions of extension and intension and 
the role possible worlds pl~y in their explication with some examples. 
Consider first the following inference: 
(a) Alice wants to marry the richest man in town. (b) The richest man in town is the stingiest man in town. (c) Alice wants to marry the stingiest man in town. 
( 13) 
The first and third sentences above are, actually ambiguous; if we 
understand them as asserting of a particular individual that Alice wants 
to marry him, the inference is legitimate. But the reading I am interested 
ia is one that cou1d be brought out more sllarply by appending 11whoever 
he may be 11 to the final noun phrases of '{13){a) and (13)(c}; on this 
reading, ,the inference is clearly invalid. The second premise asserts 
that the two descriptive noun phrases in fact pick out the same ~ndividual; 
this is what is meant by saying· that the two expressions have the same 
extension in the actual world. The fovalidity of the inference shows 
that the semantic contribution of the noun phrase to the ·truth-conditions 
of a sentence involving an intensional construction like "wants to" must 
involve more than just the extension of the noun phrase in the actual 
world. If we go further and consider how the same noun phrase~ say .. 
11the richest man in town/' would pick out different individuals in 
different possible states of affairs, or possible worlds, we recognize 
that "the richest man in town" would not always pick out the same 
individual as 11the stingiest man in town." The function which picks 
out the appropriate individual or extension in each possible world 
is in intension of the tenn; in an intensional context such as the 11wants 
to" construction, it is the intension and not the extension of the terms 
that is crucial for the truth-conditions of the sentence.10 Substituting 
in (13)(a} another term with the same intension, e.g. 11the man in town 
who has the most money" would preserve the truth-conditions of the sentence, 
but substituting a term with merely the same extension does not. 
The attributive adjective plus coTM1on noun construction discussed 
above can also be seen to be intensional in many cases. First we must 
consider what extension and intension amount to for common nouns: the 
simplest treatment is to take the extension of a common noun like doctor 
9
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to be a set of individuals: the extension of doctor in the actual world 
is the set of individuals who are doctors in that world. The intension 
of doctor·:·is the function which picks out the extension, i.e. the 
appropriate set ·Of fndividuals, in each possible world. Now consider the 
attributive adjective construction good idoctQ'\'\ · Let us suppose, just 
for the sake of examining our intuitions, that in fact all ·and only 
doctors were violinists. It would clearly not follow that the good 
doctors were the good violinists or conversely. Why? Because an 
attributive adjective like 9009 operates-.on the intension, not the 
extension, of the corranon noun 1t is ;n construction with; its interpretation 
is a function which applies to a functidn to produce a new function . 
. , 
"!~ 
Now~perhaps we are in a position to say a little more formally what 
an intens;ional model looks like. In Mol')tague's system, an intensional 
model is ~ quadruple '"t. = A, I, J, F , ,where A is a set of ~ndi vi duals, 
I is a set of possible worlds, J is an ordered set of moments of time, 
and Fis an interpretation function which assigns to each constant of 
the intensional logic an appropriate intension in the model. The 
extension of an individual constant in a given world will be some 
individual in the set A; the intension will be a function from worlds 
to individuals. The extension of a predicate constant, like Man or Runs, 
in a given world, will be a set of individuals, and the intension wnr-
be a func:tion 'from possible worlds to such sets of individuals. The 
function :F which assigns an intension to the primitive constants of 
the logic thus determines for each constant its extension in each possible 
world. The rest of the model-theoretic ·semantics involves specifying 
the interpretation of the complex ~xp~essions of the logic; for example, 
one interpretation ru1e will say that a conjunction [it, &ij,] is true 
in a g1ven world if and only if each of the conjuncts is true in that 
world . The rule for sentences of the form o it, ( 0 necessari ly lJi 11 ) 
says that o; is true in a given world w if ·and only if ; is true in 
every possible ·world. -
( 14) Sam is looking for the president of the bank. 
The president of the bank is the leader of the spy ring. 
Sam is looking for the leader of the spy ring. 
(15) a. Sam is talking to the president of the bank. 
b. The president of the bank is the leader of the spy ring. 
c. Sam is talking to the leader of the spy ring. 
The dfatfoction between the extension and the intension of expressions such 
as uthe president of the bank 11 or 11the leader of the spy ring 11 , which 
is forma1Jy .captured by considering what such phrases would refer to 
in alternative possible worlds, makes it possible to explain neatly why 
10
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the inference in (14) is invalid while that in (15) is valid. 
3. Abstract models and speakers' models. 
3.1. Logically possible worlds 
103 
As I indicated in the last section, an intensional model is a 
quadruple ,flf,.= A, I, J, F , with A 11 set of individuals, I a set of 
possible worlds, J a set of moments of time. and Fan interpretation 
function. For the purposes of model theoretic semantics, which is 
centrally concerned with characterizing valid inferences, it is sufficient 
to consider such models abstractly, and one generally introduces a 
model by saying "Let A, I, and J be arbitrary non-empty sets, .•• 11 • 
Certain constraints on the possible models may be imposed by adding 
meaning postulates to the system; one can require; for example, that 
a proper name pick out the same individual in every possible world, 
or that the interpretations assigned by F to the predicatesll bachelor 
and male be such that the extension of bachelor is always a subset of 
the extensions of male. But the set of intensional models which count 
as potential interpretations of the intensional logic and hence indirectly 
of English is still very large, so there is a sense in which one has 
not by this means been given the interpretation of English. That does 
not matter for the task of characterizing valid inferences; a fonnula $ 
logicall1 entails a formula $ of the intensional logic of the conditional [4>~$ is true in every intensional model consistent wi~h· the meaning 
postulates, with respect to all worlds and moments of time in that model. 
But not' only is it annecessary and inappropriate to the logic tan I s 
task to try to present particular intensional models in any concrete 
or explicit form, it is clearly impossible to do so with the resources 
of language. With the most conservative assumptions, the number of 
logically possible worlds in any realistic model must · be at least 
non-denumerably infinite, which means that there is no ,way they could 
be listed or enumerated by a finite description or set of rules. By 
the same token, the interpretation function F must also be given abstractly 
one simply stipulates that to each constant of the logic there is 
assigned an intension of the appropriate type, i.e. a function from 
each possible world to an extension in that world. We can describe 
these functions by saying, e.g., that the intension assigned to the 
constant bachelor is the function which picks out in each world the 
set of individuals who are bachelors in that world. But we certainly 
cannot specify such a function by considering ·the possible worlds 
one by one and saying what the extension of bachelor is in each, since 
we cannot specify all the possible wor1ds individually. If we try to 
describe the intension assigned by F to some constant at all, we must do 
so by considering how the function applies to arbitrary possible wor1ds. 
To say that we must consider all possible worlds and cannot consider 
each possible world one by one· is not as paradoxical as it may sound; 
we do the same when we consider functions defined on the real numbers, 
which are also a non-denumerably infinite set. But the nature·of the 
psychological processes underlying such abstract reasoning ability 
is, I believe, a large and unexplored problem, and one to which 
I will return briefly below. 
11
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For the moment, however, I want to stay away from the psychological 
questions and consider further the logical models. The real work of the 
intensional model is performed oat by the stipulation of the basic elements 
of the model, which is done in the abstract manner described above, but 
by the rules which.define on the basis of the model how the interpretation 
of a complex expression is determined on the basis of the interpretation 
of its parts. In assessing the adequacy of a proposed semantics for 
English, say, we assume that we have a model in which the lexical elements 
have their intended interpretations. and we then judge the adequacy of 
the interpretations assigned to sentences by checking them against our 
intuitions about their truth conditions and entailment relations. 
It is easy to bring empirical evidence to bear on proposed semantic 
analys~s at this level; the earlier-cited argument against the treatment 
of all adjectives as simple predicates is a case in point. The model 
may not specify anything about the difference between the intension of 
red-headed and that of bloode. nor about the difference between 
go9d and competeRt, but the a,fference in logical type between the two 
pairs has a great deal of explanatory force in accounting for the syntax 
and semantics of adjective constructions. 
Sa let us assume we simply take as given a set of possible worlds. 
A sentence of the form ·~~·. where the diamond is the symbol for logical 
possibility, is interpreted as true in a given model if the sentence~ 
is tr~e 'in the model at some possible world at some time. A model 
gives a 'correct' account of logical possibility if its possible worlds 
and the rest of the interpretation are such that each sentence that is 
in fact logically possible does come out true at some world and time 
in that model. But the attempt to determine which model or models 
are 1correct 1 in this sense is part of the enterprise of metaphysics, 
not of semantics. Similarly, we can characterize other notions of 
possibility. such as physical possibility, or possib~lity with respect 
to alternative future courses of events starting from the actual present. 
We can say, for instance, that 'Physically-possible~· is true in the 
actual world if rp is true in some logically possible world in which all 
the physical laws of the actual world hold; in this case, it is 
a matter for physics ta give a characterization of the relevant class 
of possible worlds. Similarly, we can say that 1 Fut11re-,possiblei>' is 
I' ' _...,,..,;.=~~;: 1g1 ~~r1iwh i ch c6i nc~ de~ .with ft1!~~kt;~~nt~Tt1i e"_'_"~'' 
given time. There are many areas where the tools of possible worlds 
semantics can offer fruitful ana1ysis of such modal constructions 
without giving more than an abstract specification of the relevant set 
of possible worlds. 
3.4 Human conceptions of possibilitX 
At this point, I want to turn away from the logician's conception 
of language as a formal system and back to the linguist's or psychologist 1s 
concern with the variously idealized competent speaker-hearer. Suppose 
we ask what it would take for a person to know a language as described 
in a Montague framework. Looking at the syntax, we find a finite 
number of primit1~e lexical items and a finite number of syntactic 
formation rules, so there is no obstac)e in principle to a speaker 
kno~in9 that part. Similarly for the rules for translating the natural 
12
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language into the language of intensional logic. 13 But when we get to the 
models described above. which form the basis of the interpretation of the 
intensional logic, we face some interesting problems. Let me focus on 
the possible worlds part of the model, since the sorts of problems I have 
in mind can all be illustrated there, although they arise for other parts 
of the model as well. 
The first problem concerns finite representabi1ity. Suppose we accept 
the claiml4 that any model adequate for getting the semantics of English 
right must have a non-denumerably infinite set of possible worlds. Then 
a human cannot have a finite representation of each of them any mare than 
the logician can give a finite description of each of them. But it doesn't 
follow that we cannot have some internalized conception of 'al l possible 
worlds 1 , only that such a conception cannot consist of an itemized enumeration. 
It seems to me that we certainly do have conceptions of non-actual possible 
states of affairs, but not in the form of complete specifications -of 
possible worlds. Among the clearest examples of conceptions of possibility 
are 1 local 1 variations on actuality. as expressed in the sentences of (16}. 
or the constructions of fantasy, which involve highly incomplete specifications 
of alternative possible worlds, as in (17}. 
(16) a. Shirley could have been a linguist. 
b. If John had gotten home on time, ••• 
c. Sam wishes that he had a son. 
(17) a. Suppose people .walked on their heads and had eyes in their toes. 
b. Superman was born on the planet Krypton, where .•• 
We do not know all the facts about the actual world, but we presumably 
all share the notion that there is one, and from that basis we can generate 
partial specifications of many alternative possible worlds by the sorts 
of local variation illustrated in (16); we could think of these representations 
as generated by a formula like that of (18): · 
{18) 'like the actual world except that ••• 1 
Such specifications will be only partial, since a given change wi 11 usually 
entail that certain other things change as well, generally with considerable 
i_ndeterminacy. (E.g. if we say 111ike the actual world except that Shirley 
becomes a linguist," we haven't specified whether Shirley goes to a different 
school, reads different books~ meets different people, or who ahd the job 
Shirley now has, etc.) 
The conceptual abilities involved in considering even these partial 
specifications of 'local• alternative worlds seem complex and powerful 
and worth a great deal of serious investigation; but especially interesting 
is the way in which we. seem to be able to generate higher~order abstract 
possibilities. For instance, here is one simple way to arrive at a non-
denumerably infinite subset of the set of possible worlds: 
(19) Consider some actual couple, say the Smiths, and consider 
some children they might have, and their children's possible 
children, and so on ad infinitum. For s1mplicity, fix the 
number of offspring of each couple and attach names to the 
individuals by generation and order of- birth. This gives 
13
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, an infinite domain A. of possible individuals (incompletely 
; specified}. Now suppose we conceive that the property of 
; having blue eyes may be distributed in any way among these 
·~ individuals, so that for any subset of A, it could be the 
j case that all and only the individuals in that subset have 
i: blue eyes. 
:°) 
,. 
The description in (19) is finite, but it is already enough to provide for 
the existence of a conception of non~denumerably. many distinct possible 
worlds; all we need for that are the notion of an infinite set and the notion 
of subset. 
< 
So it' seems to me that the problem of finite representabil ity is 
potentially solvaule; we can arrive by finite means at a conception of 
possible worlds such that there must be non-denumerably many 'Of them, 
without arjything like particular descriptions of each one, and in fact 
without having complete descriptions of any of them, and without having 
to have ariy explicit concept of non-denumerability. 
But fhere are other interesting problems to consider as well. There 
are undouqtedly general limits imposed by our cognitive capacity on the 
kinds of alternative possible worlds we can consider. And since we are 
not able to process all the logical entailments of a given proposition, 
we are prone to fall into inconsistency both in our beliefs about the actual 
world and :in our considerations of alternative possible worlds. Hence if 
we wanted tto construct a theory .of 'conceptually possible models,' we would 
probably need to allow for some sort of 'impossible worlds' as well as 
possible worlds. as Hintikka has urged for the semantics of belief-sentences. 15 
If we think about human conceptions of phycial ·possibility or ,future 
possibility, we see that there are limitations imposed by our ignorance 
of facts as well as by our general cognitive apparatus. We may well have 
some notion of alternative possible worlds or states of affairs subject 
to the actual physical laws, but we clearly don 1t know enough facts to 
know what :the physical laws are. And with respect to conceptions of 
alternative ways the future might turn out, we are limited not only in the 
foregoing ways but also by our ignorance of many present actual particular 
facts whi~h could have a causal bearing on future events. 
~ -;,i-e~~:!Si· 'd·i~.~AAM?r · ·. ,···.··s;\i# _ • . &"i ·---. ~ -- ·- «~~L\iK .. -·J!mQ 1ii1 ·;p - - · w.am1fr•&1,~ .... _ 
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What ' I want to suggest is that the kind of model posited by possible 
worlds semantics may well have a kind of psychological reality, but where 
the logicjan simply stipulates the model in a highly abstract way, the 
psychologist and perhaps the linguist could profitably investigate the 
ways in which the individual's internalized model of both. the actual world 
and of possible worlds is built up through the interaction of mind and 
reality. ·Different individuals' models undoubtedly share some properties 
and differ in others. What is shared presumably reflects properties of 
the human. perceptual and cognitive apparatus plus the mast universal 
features of human experience. Individual differences presumably result 
in part from differences in experience, which lead in many cases to differences 
in inductive generalizations and consequent differences in conceptions of 
what is possible, and probably in part from differential application of 
the cogni~ive apparatus (e.g., the creative imagination of great poets}. 
14
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General cognitive psychologists, like most linguists, would presumably 
be more interested in the co1T111on part, raising questions of' how our cognitive 
and perceptual apparatus operates on experience to generate conceptions 
of non-actual possibilities. The prelinguistic infant clearly has some 
notions of non-actua 1 possibilities, as demonstrated by surprise reactfons 
(presumably evinced by non-conformity of some actual state of affairs to 
some alternative expected state of affairs) and non-verbal expressions 
of wants (e.g. carrying a cup to an adult to ask for a drink}. One might 
attempt a kind of generative model of conceptions of possibilities to try 
to show how conceptions of novel possibilities could be derived by basic 
cognitive operations applied to the objects of perception plus whatever 
innate non-perceptual ideas we may start out with. The nature of inductive 
generalization as a psychological process might be a central object 
of investigation . These suggestions are quite speculative and tentative, 
and I should apologi.z,a immediately for my lack of familiarity with most 
of the psychological literature; perhaps what I am suggesting is already 
underway .16 
For the psychologist interested in individual differences, including 
those concerned with therapy, the relevant .questions would presumably be 
how individual differences: in internalized fOCldels arise, and how models 
can be changed. Perhaps a prior practical question to consider is how 
individual differences in models can be detected; here the notion of 
"language as a window on the mind 11 might take on a new importance. When 
two individuals have different models of what is possible--logically 
possible, physically possible, humanly possible, or whatever--they could 
utter the same sentence, and with the same meaning in one sense. and yet 
their conceptions of the truth conditions and entailments ·of that sentence 
could differ markedly. A typical case might be one in which a couple ·agree 
on the statement that she always gets angry at certain things he does; in 
his model of alternative possible worlds there are none in which he stops 
doing whatever it is (it 1 s 'part of his nature'} but there are worlds in 
which she doesn•t get angry at it, while in her model of alternative possible 
worlds there are none in which that behavior of his fai ls to provoke anger 
(it's an 1 involuntary reaction•) but some in which he stops doing it. 
For some reason that therapists have probably figured out. the biggest holes 
in our conceptions of possibilities often seem to be in imagining ways 
we could ourselves change; we seem to have much less difficulty in imagining 
changes in others. 
For the linguist or philosopher of language, a closely related issue 
is the question of how a public language is possiblT7if all that speakers have to operate with are.their internalized models. Perhaps :the use of 
demonstratives is crucial here, as a link between language and reality that 
bypasses the need for descriptive accuracy.18 But that issue would take 
us too far afield here. 
In conclusion, what I hope to have accomplished here is ,to describe 
enough of the framework of Montague. grarm1ar to show something of its 
suitability for describing the syntax and semantics of natural languages, 
and to show how issues that arise in considering the potential psychological 
reality of the possible worlds models that lie at its base may open up 
new areas for profitable joint exploration by philosophers, linguists, 
and psychologists. · 
15
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Footnotes 
I am grateful to Ernmon Bach for much helpful discussion and support, 
to students and faculty at UC Berkeley and at Stanford University for 
opportunities to present and discuss early stages of my thoughts on this 
topic, particularly Julius Moravcsik, Patrick Suppes, Herbert Clark, 
Eve Clark, Jaakko Hintak~a, and Alice ter Meulen. 
I am a,.1 so grateful to the. Center for Advanced Study in the Behavi ora 1 
Sciences for the fellowship which made the preparation of this paper 
possible; P.art of the funds for the Center fellowship came from the 
National Science Foundation and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. I also 
wish to express my gratitude to Raphael Stern for inviting me to participate 
in the conference for which the paper was prepared. 
'f 
l. See Chomsky (1975), p. 4 and pp. 42-51. 
2. For exp·ository simplicity I am considering only binary constructions, 
but in ;fact the syntactic rules can combine any finite number of 
constituent expressions. 
3. The rules I am,here for simplicity calling 'semantic rules• are just 
the first stage of the two-.stage semantics described above; their· function 
is to prov;de the translation from English into the language of intensional 
logic. · 
4. Partee .(1973); but s·ee Bach and Cooper (forthcoming) for an argument 
that shows that a structure like (3a) is tenable if the is allowed to 
have more than one interpretation. ~ 
5. The formulations in (4} and (5) om1t~he important technical detail 
that both the syntactic and semantic rules in this case are actually 
schemata; F3 is actually an infinite set of functions F3 . one for each choice of variable to relativize over syntactically,and perform 
lambda abstraction on semantically. 
6. This 'discussion of adjectives draws heavily on the work of Terence 
. . Par.son · · · ·· ··· · ·· ······· ·· ···· ···-·········-· ···· 
7. The example is from Siegel (1976b). 
8. See Partee (forthcoming) for a discussion and some proposals. 
9. See Partee {forthcoming). 
1~. Hintikka (1969} has interesting suggestions for not always considering 
the extension in all possible worlds, but rather in an example such as 
this one consider"fng the extension in the set of all worlds compatible 
with Alice's wants. In this discussion I am ignoring the disputes 
and problems that still remain in the area of 11 propositional attitudes, 11 
and concentrating on the arguments for showing that something at least 
as powerful as the extension/intension distinction is needed. 
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11. More precisly, the predicate constants in the intensional logic into 
which the English words bachelor and male are translated. 
12. In one sense, the schemata mentioned in footnote 5 result :n there 
being an infinite number of syntactic formation rules, but since 
109., 
the schemata are finitely expressible, the distinction is not important 
here. 
13. The same remarks apply here as in footnote 12. 
14. See David Lewis (1973), p. 90, footnote. The chapter of which that 
is part is also an excellent statement of the 11rea1ist 11 position on 
possible worlds. " 
15. See Hintikka (1970a), {1970b), ,i975). 
16. Since the rest of this was written, I have become aware that there· 
is indeed some apparent progress in this direction in cognitive 
psychology and artificial intelligence, including in particular a 
growing concern with the nature of mental representations and their 
acquisition. See, for example, Anderson and Bower (1973), Klahr and 
Wallace {1976), Miller and Johnson-Laird {1976), Kintsch {1974}, 
Piaget (1970), Fodor (1975). I am grateful to Lauren Resnick for 
bringing several of these works to 11\Y attention. 
17. In this connection, Hilary Putnam's ideas about the social division 
of linguistic labor and about the extent to which the nature of real-
world paradigms determines the extension of our terms are of great 
potential interest. See· Putnam (1975). 
18. See Putnam {1975), Kripke {1972). Kaplan (1977). 
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